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In retrospect, the interwar years represented a golden age for British Conservatism.  
As the Times remarked in 1948, during the ‘long day of Conservative power which 
stretched with only cloudy intervals between the two world wars’ the only point at 
issue was how the party might ‘choose to use the power that was almost their 
freehold’.2  Nowhere was this sense of all-pervading calm more evident than in the 
sphere of constitutional affairs.  The settlement of the Irish question in 1921-22 
ensured a generation of relative peace for the British constitution.3  It removed from 
the political arena an issue that had long troubled the Conservatives’ sense of ‘civic 
nationalism’ - their feeling that the defining quality of the ‘nation’ to which they owed 
fealty was the authority of its central institutions, notably parliament and the Crown – 
and simultaneously took the wind from the sails of the nationalist movements in 
Wales and Scotland.4  Other threats to the status quo, such as Socialism, were also 
kept under control.   The Labour Party’s failure to capture an outright majority of 
seats at any inter-war election curbed its ability to embark on the radical reshaping of 
society that was its avowed aim, a prospect which, in any case, astute Tory 
propagandising ensured was an unattractive proposition to most people before the 
second world war.5  
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The general election of 1945, however, reshaped the battleground of British politics 
and confronted the Conservative Party with different challenges.  The Labour Party’s 
large majority allowed Attlee’s government to pursue its radical agenda unhindered, 
and raised for Conservatives the spectre of an all-powerful, socialist State in which 
control would be sucked into the centre, parliament made redundant and the ‘British 
way of life’, based on hardy individualism and personal initiative, undermined.  As 
the Cold War took hold Conservative anxieties increased and the concern that the 
Labour Party might unwittingly ‘hold open the door’ for communism was often 
voiced.  Nationalism, too, re-emerged in the Celtic heartlands of Scotland and Wales.  
Its challenge was different to that posed by Labour:  Socialism threatened over-
centralisation, but the nationalists, with their demands for separate legislative 
assemblies in Cardiff and Edinburgh, promised to fragment the State.  As the 
Conservative Party made its hard way back from the great defeat of 1945, its central 
vision of how the State should be run was menaced from opposite sides by the 
competing ideologies of socialism and nationalism.    
 
In this chapter, the extent to which Conservative policy towards Wales and Scotland 
was shaped by these forces in the decades after the war will be examined.  Their 
relationship with the two countries was different. The Conservatives had a deep-
rooted connection with Scotland that they lacked with the principality.6  Several party 
leaders and cabinet ministers hailed from Scotland and Lord Salisbury had appointed 
the first Secretary for Scotland in 1885; by 1939 the post had been upgraded, and now 
a Secretary of State sat in Cabinet, with an Under Secretary and a Scottish Office in 
Edinburgh.7 Between the wars, the country was a Conservative stronghold, with the 
party capturing almost half of Scottish seats between 1924 and 1939.  In Wales, by 
contrast, the Conservatives had shallow roots.  A bare 15% of the seats fell to their 
share between 1924 and 1939, and despite some ad hoc devolution of government 
functions to Cardiff, there was desire to treat Wales in the same way as Scotland. In 
1938 Chamberlain became the last in a series of inter-war Ministers to turn down 
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requests for a Welsh Secretary of State.8  As a consequence the Conservatives were 
regarded in Wales as the party of England in a way that was not so true in Scotland, 
and their inability to recruit sufficient Welsh-speaking Welshmen constantly 
undermined attempts to establish an enduring influence outside the anglicised fringe 
of the principality.9 The Conservatives had less to gain and less to lose in Wales, and 
their approach to policy-making reflected this. 
 
The chapter falls into three sections corresponding to clear phases of Conservative 
thinking about the problem of devolution, and related, in turn, to the perceived threats 
posed by socialism and nationalism.  Section one deals with the years immediately 
after the war, when the threat of socialism was paramount; section two focuses on the 
years of government between 1951 and 1964 when the socialist threat receded 
beneath the blanket of mid-century prosperity and nationalism’s peripheral barks grew 
fainter; the final section examines the decade between 1964 and 1974, when 
nationalism rather than Socialism became the principal threat.    
 
 
Section 1:  A Minister proposed, 1945-51. 
Throughout the period between 1945 and 1951 Conservatives feared that Labour’s 
Socialist policies were creating an over-mighty State.  Although their anxiety on this 
head was not new,10 it gained intensity after 1945 as fear of the Soviet Union’s 
ambitions grew.  It was typified by the comment of Winston Churchill, whose own 
contempt for communism was deep-seated,11 that a victory for Labour at the general 
election of 1945 would lead to the introduction of a ‘Gestapo’ in Britain.12  If 
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Labour’s programme became law, he suggested, and a ‘complete socialist system’ 
was introduced, ‘effective and healthy opposition and the natural change in parties in 
office from time to time would necessarily come to an end and a political police 
would be required to enforce an absolute and permanent system upon the nation.’13  A 
week later he suggested that under a ‘Socialist regime’, people would become ‘mere 
cogs for the service of the State without privileges or freedom of any kind’14    
 
If fear of the Labour Party’s centralising policies formed one axis of concern for 
Conservatives, the rise of nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales formed another.  
The Scottish Nationalist Party [SNP] had performed well at a series of by-elections 
during the war, and captured Motherwell at a by-election in 1945.  Although both they 
and Plaid Cymru performed less well at the general election of 1945, both recovered 
ground at subsequent by-elections.15  In 1946, the Welsh nationalists took 30% of the 
vote at Ogmore and over 20% at Aberdare, while the SNP, with local Conservative 
backing, secured 43.2% of the poll at the Paisley by-election in February 1948.16  By 
the end of the decade extensive petitioning campaigns calling for the creation of 
legislative assemblies in both countries provided another testament to the vitality of 
nationalist sentiment.  The Scottish Convention began circulating its Covenant in 
1949, while the New Wales Union inaugurated a similar campaign in 1950. The 
unsettling influence of nationalist activity prompted the Conservative grass roots in 
both countries to demand explicit expressions of devolutionary intent from central 
policy-makers. However, as this section will underline, Conservative policy makers 
only accommodated such pressure when it visibly benefited the larger campaign 
against socialism. 
 
The general election of 1945 left the Conservative party in disarray; the leadership did 
little to point a direction for the party in the country.17  Only in 1946, when the party 
Conference demanded a statement of policy was a committee established under R. A. 
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Butler, which produced the Industrial Charter in May 1947.18  The Charter marked 
the party’s acceptance of those measures of nationalisation which had already taken 
place; greater openness towards Trades Unions; and more economic intervention than 
Tories normally allowed.19  However, it also emphasised the party’s opposition to 
further nationalisation, state monopoly and the curbing of individual enterprise, and 
demanded that the State ‘devolve both the making of plans and their execution’ to 
more local bodies, and ensure ‘adequate decentralisation with special regard to 
Scotland and Wales’.20 Their concern for Scotland was particularly marked, and they 
highlighted their sympathy with ‘Scottish anxiety at the way in which control over its 
economy is being centralised in London, four hundred miles from its industries.’21 
 
The principle of  ‘decentralisation’ enshrined in this analysis would form a key 
element in Conservative strategy in the post war years;  at grass roots level in 
Scotland and Wales, however, it was augmented by a heightened sensibility to the 
threat of nationalism.  The Scottish Unionist Members Committee [SUMC], alarmed 
by the pervasiveness of ‘the belief that insufficient attention is paid to the needs of the 
country’ had started to consider the scope for further administrative devolution as 
early as October 1946.22 Their deliberations were given added urgency by the SNP’s 
unexpectedly strong display at Paisley in February 1948, and the subsequent decision 
by the Scottish Convention to circulate a petition (or ‘covenant’) calling for a Scottish 
parliament.  The Scottish Unionists responded with a specially convened conference 
at which they recommended a far-reaching package of measures including the 
appointment of a new Minister of State for Scotland with an additional under-
secretary; a Royal Commission to examine financial relations between Scotland and 
England; and the creation of separate executives for the nationalised industries in 
Scotland.23 All were incorporated in the Party’s Scottish Manifesto, Scottish Control 
of Scottish Affairs.24 Though a response to nationalism, the policies complemented the 
larger battle against Socialism.  As the conference itself concluded, the battle against 
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Socialism had to take priority for the simple reason that ‘Because centralisation is an 
essential part of Socialist belief, there will be increasingly less recognition of Scotland 
while Socialism lasts’.25  
 
In Wales, Conservatives responded in similar fashion. In October 1946, the MP for 
Caernarvon, Col Price-White, told the House of Commons of the ‘unity of desire and 
demand for special Ministerial control of Welsh affairs on the part of Welsh men and 
women’,26 and a year later, introduced a successful motion at the Conservative Party’s 
annual conference urging the formulation of a policy for Wales.27 Central Office 
tasked a somewhat reluctant Enoch Powell with visiting Wales and devising a policy 
document.28 After two fact-finding missions, he recommended that the party appoint 
someone either in, or with access to, the Cabinet to ensure ‘attention to Welsh 
interests in all spheres of government.’29  This became the party’s policy.  In January 
1948, Butler promised that a member of the Cabinet would be appointed to safeguard 
Welsh interests and to liaise with civil servants. ‘They needed not a Minister with 
over-riding powers’, he told the Commons, ‘which would lead to muddle, but a 
watchdog of Welsh affairs – an Ambassador for Wales in the Government.’30   While 
a few voices were raised in protest against the proposed Minister for Wales - 
‘Ruritanian nonsense’ blustered ‘Kelticus’ in the Western Mail,31 the party made the 
post the central plank of The Conservative Policy for Wales and Monmouthshire, 
published in 1949.32 Yet, in Wales as in Scotland, the adoption of the policy reflected 
its perceived utility in the fight against Socialism as the claims of regional identity. 
Even the Western Mail, which had sought greater concessions, greeted the document 
by hoping the ‘Welsh Charter’ would appeal to ‘all who fervently desire a relaxation 
of State control’ and ‘a restoration of individual freedom’.33    
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In 1949, the Conservatives produced a major statement of policy, The Right Road for 
Britain. Here, the full reach of the decentralisation policy was visible for the first 
time.  Alongside the distinctive solutions developed for Wales and Scotland were 
policies designed to empower local government across Britain.34 As Churchill told a 
conference on this theme in October 1949, Labour was threatening ‘to replace our 
well-tried system of local government’ with an ‘alien’ system of non-elected bodies 
‘manipulated from Whitehall’. 35 The Conservatives, he maintained, would ‘take care 
that local government remains a true reflection of the communities it exists to serve, 
rather than a mere appendage or even utensil of any Government which rules in 
Westminster.36 Local government reform would remain a key element in 
Conservative thinking about devolution for the remainder of the period covered by 
this chapter.  
 
The Tories’ anti-centralisation platform played an important role in the general 
election of 1950.37  Churchill elaborated the theme for audiences in Edinburgh and 
Cardiff in the week before the election, arguing that nationalism was the result of 
Labour’s centralising policy, and sympathising with Scots who might wish to leave a 
Union dominated from London.38  At Cardiff, he was more circumspect,39 and 
explained that the Conservative policy of a Minister for Welsh Affairs offered the best 
counter to the ‘handcuffs of centralisation’ proposed by Labour.  The message seemed 
to get through.  In Scotland, the Conservatives and their National Liberal allies gained 
4 seats, and though no additional seats were secured in Wales the party’s share of the 
vote rose to 27%.40  
 
The narrow majority retained by Labour ensured that another election could not long 
be delayed.  In the twenty months between the elections of 1950 and 1951, however, 
fresh evidence emerged that the principal driver for Conservative policy-making was 
socialism rather than nationalism.  In Wales, a body inspired by the Scottish 
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Convention, and calling itself the ‘New Wales Union’, began circulating a petition 
calling for a Welsh parliament.41 The initial reaction of local Conservatives to the idea 
ranged from mockery - it would be no more than ‘a glorified county council’, said 
one42 – to more apocalyptic predictions that, given the likely predominance of Labour 
members from the industrial belt, it would be a ‘Socialist Prison’.43 That local feathers 
were ruffled, however, was revealed when a hastily convened gathering of Welsh 
Conservatives met at Ludlow in May.44  The meeting denounced the current 
Conservative policy on Wales as ‘weak and unattractive’ and resolved to seek an 
audience with Butler to insist on securing for Wales ‘the same sort of political set up 
as Scotland’.  
 
The party leadership, however, remained unmoved.  The chairman of the Wales and 
Monmouth Area felt the party had gone far enough on the issue of Welsh devolution. 
As he wrote in a private memo to constituency chairmen in Wales:  ‘We should avoid 
taking a step which would in the end help the Welsh nationalists.  We should not open 
the door to them in the way the Socialists open the door for the Communists.  We do 
not want to take the first step which would help a separatist movement.’45  Socialism 
remained the principal enemy and the existing policy was deemed sufficient to meet 
this challenge. When the Conservative Party’s Aims for Wales was published in 
October, the original proposal for a Minister remained.46   
 
The 1951 election vindicated the strategy. In both Wales and Scotland, the Nationalist 
vote was squeezed; all the Plaid Cymru candidates lost their deposits.47 The 
Conservative big guns rechristened decentralisation and called it ‘local patriotism’.  
Lord Wootton assured an audience at Anglesey that the party did not want to ‘treat 
Wales as a region of England … Conservatism was the enemy of centralisation, and 
the champion of local patriotism;’48 Butler, speaking in Blaenau Ffestiniog, explained 
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that Conservatives liked ‘local patriotism’ and this was why, ‘in local government, we 
so deplore the Socialist tendency to transfer powers to Whitehall. Conservatives 
distrust centralisation.’49 Anthony Eden drove home the central message at large 
meetings in Cardiff and Edinburgh, where he said that socialism inevitably meant 
government by monopoly, bureaucracy and control from Whitehall, and an ever more 
powerful State.50  In Glasgow Churchill condemned the ‘concentration of power in 
one place and in one set of party-biased hands’ and promised that a Conservative 
government would take steps to ‘see that Scotland is no longer treated as though she 
were some province or appendage of England’.51 
 
The election returned the Conservatives to power.  They won 321 seats, a majority of 
17 over Labour, Liberals and ‘Others’. In Scotland, the party claimed almost 50% of 
the votes cast and won three more seats, bringing its total to 29.  In Wales, the share 
of the vote reaped by the Conservatives and their National Liberal allies rose above 
30% of the total, and victories in Conway and Barry brought the party’s total 
representation in the principality to six.52 Although the suspicion lingers that the 
party’s promise of a Minister for Wales had little direct influence on this improved 
performance, the wider policy of which it formed a part, decentralisation, had clearly 
been very successful in Britain as a whole.  From a devolutionary perspective, it now 
remained to be seen whether the promises forged during the dark night of opposition 
would be redeemed in the cool morning of victory.  
 
 
Section II:  The Minister for Welsh Affairs Era: 1951-64   
 
On their return to government in 1951, the Conservatives moved quickly to fulfil their 
election pledges to Wales and Scotland.  In the former, a ‘Minister of Welsh Affairs’ 
was appointed, together with an Under Secretary with his own PPS.  Scotland 
received a Minister of State to act as a deputy to the Secretary of State, and to work 
mainly in Scotland itself, together with a third Under-Secretary of State and a Royal 
Commission on Scottish Affairs.  Despite the activity of the first months, little further 
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progress was made on devolution in the years of Conservative government beyond the 
transfer of some minor administrative functions were devolved to the Scottish 
Office.53  The fear of Socialist centralisation that led the party to offer concessions to 
both countries in the The Right Road for Britain (1949) was effectively neutralised by 
their own victory in 1951. With the reins of government in their own hands there was 
little pressure on the central party to consider further constitutional innovations.  At 
the same time, the electorate seemed content with the status quo. The 1950s saw the 
Unionists advance in both Wales and Scotland Unionists, especially the latter, where 
they captured on average some 46% of the vote.54 However, the failure of the party 
leadership to embrace the notion of a Secretary of State for Wales allowed the 
initiative in Welsh affairs to pass inexorably to the Labour Party.    
 
The post of Minister for Welsh Affairs was designed to be held in tandem with a 
senior Cabinet position.55  In the 13 years it existed, four different individuals held the 
post.  The first, and arguably most successful, was Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who 
combined the role with that of Home Secretary.56 The fact of Maxwell Fyfe’s being a 
Scot caused some expressions of outrage in the principality:57 one correspondent of  
the Western Mail, for example, wondered whether cynicism should have been carried 
to its logical conclusion and Oliver Lyttleton appointed ‘Colonial Secretary and 
Minister for Welsh Affairs’.58  Some of the sting of Maxwell Fyfe’s appointment was 
drawn by the nomination of David Llywellyn, MP for Cardiff North, and Howell 
Garner Evans, National Liberal MP for Denbigh, as Under Secretary and PPS 
respectively.59     
 
Maxwell Fyfe’s tenure of the office was, in fact, highly successful on both personal 
and political grounds. He quickly garnered a crop of good reviews from different parts 
of Wales. No less a figure than Huw T. Edwards, chair of the Council for Wales, 
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remarked:  ‘The more we deal with him, and the more we meet him, the more we are 
impressed by his genuine desire to do something of practical value for Wales.  The 
minister is really concerned about the affairs of Wales.’60  It was with some justice 
that the Western Mail remarked, in April 1952: ‘Within a few months of his taking 
office Sir David has succeeded in making Conservatives and Conservatism better 
liked in Wales than they have been for generations.’61    
 
Hard work and skilful diplomacy lay at the root of Maxwell Fyfe’s success.62  In the 
first year alone, he visited Wales on no fewer than twenty occasions, speaking to a 
wide variety of representative bodies and even asking for a Welsh Dragon pennant for 
his Home Office car when in the principality on Ministerial duties.63  He succeeded in 
blocking both the proposed afforestation of a section of the Towy valley and the siting 
of a planned weapons range on the Lleyn Peninsula, while also ensuring that the day-
to-day control of primary and secondary education was transferred to Wales.64 The 
party was not slow to capitalise on Maxwell Fyfe’s good track record.  At the end of 
its first year in office, the Conservatives issued a short leaflet detailing their successes, 
the Review of Welsh Affairs, in English and Welsh editions.65    
 
Maxwell Fyfe was ably supported by his Under Secretaries.  David Llywellyn soon 
resigned on health grounds,66 but his successor, Lord Lloyd was well chosen.  Lloyd 
was a resident of Hitchin in Hertfordshire, but had served in the Welsh Guards during 
the war and had long fielded Welsh questions in the House of Lords.  Although there 
was some disappointment that a Welsh MP had not been selected for the post,67 
Churchill defended the appointment on the grounds that, not being bound by the same 
rules of attendance as a member of the lower chamber, Lloyd could spend more time 
in the principality and ‘attend personally at conferences and on delegations affecting 
Welsh affairs both within the Principality and at Whitehall.’68 It was the model which 
had been adopted in Scotland, where Lord Home’s spell as Minister of State was 
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proceeding successfully, and was to become a permanent feature of the arrangements 
in Wales.  Lloyd’s chief contribution was to head a committee of business leaders 
which considered ways of bringing new industries to Wales, improving roads and 
boosting tourism.69 
 
The new arrangements for the administration of Wales were probably at their most 
effective and popular during the tenure of Maxwell-Fyfe and Lloyd.  Both men moved 
on during the reshuffle occasioned by the retirement of Churchill in 1955, and 
thereafter the vitality of the post was lost.  For the next two years, Gwilym Lloyd 
George, (supported by Lord Mancroft,) continued to combine the posts of Minister for 
Welsh Affairs and Home Secretary, a period which saw Cardiff formally designated 
the capital of Wales.  In 1957, however, the post was reassigned to the Minister for 
Housing and Local Government, Henry Brooke, a sensible rationalisation of the role 
given the extensive organisational contacts this Department had with the principality.  
At the same time, the post of Under Secretary was upgraded and its occupant became 
Minister of State for Wales.  Macmillan’s choice for the new position fell upon an 
obscure Breconshire councillor, Vivian Lewis, who took the title Baron Brecon of 
Llanfeigan.70  Macmillan’s thinking was similar to that of Churchill’s in appointing 
Lord Lloyd. ‘I felt it right’, he explained to an audience in Swansea during the 1959 
election campaign, ‘that there should not only be a Minister for Wales but a Minster 
in Wales, centred upon Cardiff and travelling continuously throughout the principality 
… to ensure the co-ordination of economic development and [gauge] the changing 
needs of employment and industry.’71   
 
Brooke’s tenure of the office was troubled.72 He failed to capture the public 
imagination and his reform of administrative arrangements antagonised the Council 
for Wales, with which both Maxwell Fyfe and Gwilym Lloyd George had worked 
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well. The Council produced a highly critical report in January 1957 complaining that 
there was insufficient coordination between government departments; that Welsh civil 
servants were graded too low to carry weight at Whitehall; and that the Minister for 
Wales lacked executive authority.73  They recommended the appointment of a 
Secretary of State with two Under Secretaries.  Macmillan refused to grant this, 
offering instead a Minister of State, an economic committee of the Conference of 
Heads of Departments in Wales, and a strengthening of the ‘senior cadre’ of civil 
servants available to support the Minister of State for Wales and the Minister for 
Welsh Affairs.  It was not enough, however, and Huw T. Edwards and four others 
resigned from the Council.74 It was Brooke, too, who had to deal with the fallout from 
probably the most controversial issue to arise during the Tories’ period in office, the 
planned flooding of the Tryweryn valley to supply Liverpool with water, a cause 
which Plaid Cymru took up with alacrity.75  
 
In fact, Brooke and Lord Brecon had a good story to tell about economic development 
in Wales – at the election of 1959, for example, they claimed to have brought 10,000 
new jobs to Wales76 - but Brooke cannot have been sorry to move on. His 
replacement in 1961 was Sir Keith Joseph who held the post until Labour were 
returned at the election of 1964.  Labour’s decision to replace the Minister for Welsh 
Affairs with a fully-fledged Secretary of State for Wales brought to an end the post’s 
thirteen-year existence.77  With so many changes at the Cabinet level, it was 
unsurprising that the key player after 1957 was not the Minister but his deputy, Lord 
Brecon, who held the post until Labour returned to office. Brecon provided an 
enduring focus of stability in Welsh affairs and his appointment remained, in the eyes 
of one observer, ‘the most successful move the Conservatives made to try and meet 
Welsh demands.’78 
 
                                                 
73 Butt Philip, The Welsh Question, p. 281. 
74 WM, 12 September 1959,; Butt Philip, The Welsh Question, pp. 77-8, 297-8;  Andrew Walling, 
‘The Structure of Power in Labour Wales, 1951-1964’,  in D. Tanner, et .al., Labour Party in Wales, 
p.196. 
75 Owen G Roberts, ‘Developing the untapped wealth of Britain's ‘Celtic Fringe’: Water 
engineering and the Welsh landscape, 1870 – 1960’, Landscape Research, 31 (2006), pp. 121-33. 
76 WM, 3 October 1959,  
77 WM, 2 October 1964.  Russell Martin Deacon, The Governance of Wales:  The Welsh Office and 
the Policy Process 1964-99 (Cardiff, UWP, 2002), pp. 18-19. 
78 Griffith, Memory, p.163. 
 14 
The creation of the Minister of State for Welsh Affairs was complemented by a steady 
devolution of administrative functions to the principality.79  Reforms in 1952, 1954, 
and 1958 gave the Cardiff Office of the Ministry of Education responsibility for 
running the every-day business of education in Wales; similarly, the Welsh Office of 
the Ministry of Health and Local Government had acquired responsibility for all local 
government matters in Wales and Monmouthshire by 1960. A new Commissioner for 
Wales was appointed at the Ministry of Transport and the status of the Welsh 
Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture was up-graded in 1956 so that he became 
responsible for 900 civil servants.  The decision to up-grade the Under Secretary’s 
post to that of Minister of State in 1957 was part of a wider reorganisation of 
arrangements within Welsh government noted above, and in 1963 the Conservatives 
created a Welsh economic intelligence unit, rather misleadingly called the ‘Welsh 
Office’.80  By 1964, a variety of Departments, including Education, Housing and 
Local Government, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Transport had offices in Wales.81 
 
The nature of this process, however, should not be misunderstood.  Vernon Bogdanor 
has highlighted the fact that these administrative changes did not reflect any ‘overall 
plan of devolution’: ‘the process of decentralisation’, he contends, ‘was entirely 
pragmatic, and the extent of decentralisation differed from department to 
department.’82  And contemporary reviews were mixed.  While the Western Mail 
could report by the end of the decade that ‘literally no Government plan affecting 
Wales now reaches the Cabinet without careful scrutiny from the Welsh point of 
view’,83 a more common view seems to have been that voiced by Labour MP, W. T. 
Jones, who told the House of Commons in 1957:  ‘I cannot think of a single benefit 
that has accrued to Wales as a result of the appointment of a Minister for Welsh 
Affairs … No special legislation has been brought forward peculiar to Wales and 
exclusive of England and Scotland.’84  The Minister for Welsh Affairs had not 
secured for Wales the tangible advantages that the Secretary of State had gained for 
Scotland. 
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The question that must be addressed in the remainder of this section is why, having 
taken the initiative in creating the Minister for Welsh Affairs post, and subsequently 
allowed pragmatic devolution of administrative functions to the principality, the 
Conservative hierarchy remained unwilling to countenance the next step, the 
upgrading of the Minister to a full Secretary of State for Wales?   
 
That there was a significant body of support in Welsh Conservative circles for the 
creation of a Secretary of State for Wales is indisputable. It arose in part from the 
local party’s enduring anxiety concerning Plaid Cymru. Although average electoral 
support for Plaid peaked at about 10% in 1959, support in their strongholds of 
Caernarvon and Merioneth ran at about 20%, and their impressive performances at 
Aberdare (1954) and Newport (1956) demonstrated they could be a potent force at by-
elections.85  As the Western Mail reflected after the first of these, the Nationalists 
would represent a genuine threat in the principality as long as they could argue that 
the problems of Wales were receiving scant attention from Whitehall – a contention 
the appointment of a Secretary of State might help refute.86 The Parliament for Wales 
petitioning campaign, moreover, attracted considerable support.87  Welsh Tories were 
undoubtedly flustered by the assertion of Plaid’s leader, Gwynfor Evans, that the 
250,000 signatures on the petition finally submitted to parliament in March 1956 
proved nearly 80% of people wanted Home Rule for Wales.88 
 
Another motivation for those who supported the appointment of a Secretary of State 
for Wales was the (perhaps sentimental) desire for constitutional parity with Scotland.  
This was a cornerstone of the Western Mail’s position, and in July 1954, Sir Godfrey 
Llywellyn toured Wales and told the party chairman, Lord Woolton, that in towns 
such as Cardiff, Swansea and Llangollen there had been unanimous agreement that 
the Minister for Wales should become ‘a whole time office with cabinet rank’.89  Nine 
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months later, on the eve of the 1955 election, Geoffrey Block of the Conservative 
Research Department reported very similar sentiments at the West Wales and 
Monmouth Council meeting in Carmarthen.90 Several candidates at the 1955 election, 
including Raymond Gower in Barry and Michael Roberts in Cardiff South East, came 
out in favour of a Secretary of State.91  
 
The Conservative manifesto of 1955, however, promised only that the ‘steady policy 
of administrative devolution should go on and go further’.92 The party hierarchy 
remained immovable for several reasons.  First, they were not convinced that opinion 
within the Welsh Conservative party was genuinely united in favour of more 
devolution.  Hostility to what Block called ‘this highfallutin’ nonsense of a Secretary 
of State and two Under-Secretaries and a glass coach’ could certainly be found, and a 
report by the Bow Group, Work for Wales (1959), openly disputed the need for a 
Secretary of State for Wales.93 Second, the party hierarchy believed that the present 
arrangements were adequate to the administrative needs of Wales,94 and that the 
appointment of a Secretary of State might make life more complicated.  As Central 
Office pointed out in 1957, if there were a Secretary of State, MPs and Deputations 
would have to conduct all their business through that office which would then be 
responsible for delegating it to one of the nineteen new assistant secretaries.95 It was a 
view that contained more than an echo of the analysis advanced by Neville 
Chamberlain in 1938.96  A third reason for the party’s lukewarm attitude to the idea of 
a Secretary of State was a conviction that it would win them few votes.  At election 
after election, the issue of Welsh devolution proved ephemeral in all but a few 
northern constituencies where Conservative chances of success were in any case 
slight.97 This was true even in 1964, when Labour promised the electorate a Secretary 
of State.98 In Wales, as in Scotland, Conservative candidates fought primarily on 
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national issues and with like results: the proportion of the vote they and their National 
Liberal allies secured in Wales remained buoyant at around or just over 30% of the 
total.  By 1959 the party held seven Welsh seats.99  
 
If considerations of practicality and expediency formed important elements in the 
party hierarchy’s unwillingness to countenance the creation of a Secretary of State, 
there was also a strong ideological dimension. The creation of a Minster for Welsh 
Affairs had formed one element of the decentralisation policy enshrined in The Right 
Road for Britain (1949). As John Ramsden has argued, the review had an enduring 
imapct:  ‘at least until 1965’, he contends, ‘… a solid body of Party policy was in 
existence which could be modified, refined and kept up to date with changing 
circumstances’.100  The original justification for the Minister of State for Wales 
remained at the forefront of the party leaders’ minds throughout the 1950s. Thus when 
Anthony Eden visited Cardiff in 1955, 101 he tied the benefits that Minister for Welsh 
Affairs had brought to Wales to the Conservatives’ wider commitment to localised 
government:  ‘Our aim is always to secure a sufficient measure of devolution for 
Welsh local authorities …[in] … matters of day-to-day business with Departments in 
Wales’, he concluded, adding, ‘I hope you will agree that all this is  proof that we are 
opposed to the idea of running the United Kingdom from Whitehall.’   This echo of 
the 1951 campaign was heard in many speeches in both Wales and Scotland during 
the 1950s.102 
 
The fear that the creation of a Secretary of State might empower either Socialists or 
nationalists in Wales, and thus make the administrative task of any future 
Conservative government more difficult, remained paramount.  As C. Chegwidden, 
the party’s political education officer, noted in 1957, the argument often used by 
supporters of the Secretary of State plan, that it would ‘put a sprag in the wheel of the 
Nationalist chariot’,103  overlooked the possibility that it might equally create a 
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platform on which Plaid could realise its ambitions.   ‘The skeleton framework for a 
Parliament for Wales would be much nearer looking like a permanent structure than it 
does now,’ he argued.  The principal objection to that, as noted earlier, was that any 
such Assembly would almost inevitably become a Labour fiefdom, dominated as it 
must be by representatives of the industrial south-east.  Thus Conservatives feared 
that if they replaced their current Minister of State for Welsh Affairs, appointed to 
keep socialism at bay, with a Secretary of State, they might unwittingly open the door 
to the creation of a Welsh parliament and the very denouement they had worked 
assiduously to avoid: an unbreachable socialist power-base in the principality. 
 
The Conservatives made no commitment to create a Secretary of State at the general 
election of 1964.  Some consideration was given to the suggestion that the Welsh 
Office at Cardiff might be made independent and ‘wholly responsible for 
redevelopment in Wales and all Welsh affairs’, while retaining a Minster for Welsh 
Affairs with cabinet rank.104 In the event, the manifesto made no such declaration.105  
During the campaign, the party grandees rehearsed their familiar lines, talked up the 
successes recorded during the years of Conservative government, and warned that 
Labour’s proposals would be less effective and more expensive.106 
 
While a significant section of grass roots opinion was thus attracted by the idea of a 
Secretary of State during the 1950s, partly to achieve parity with Scotland and partly 
to outflank Plaid Cymru, the party hierarchy remained convinced by their original 
decentralising rationale. Any move to create a Secretary of State in Wales, they 
reasoned, enhanced the possibility of a Welsh parliament, which in turn would 
institutionalise a Labour administration in Wales that would simply fall in with any 
centralising plans a future Labour government might introduce.  The party also 
estimated, correctly, that there were very few votes at stake in this area. The 
consequence of Labour’s victory at the 1964 election, however, was that a Secretary 
of State was created for Wales.  The catechisms formulated for the Right Road for 
Britain in 1949 were rendered redundant; the party would have to devise a fresh 
approach to the problem of Welsh and Scottish government.      
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Section III: Facing the Nationalist challenge 
 
The general election of 1964 brought to an end thirteen years of Conservative 
government.  The party fared badly in both Wales and Scotland: in the principality, 
the Conservatives lost one seat and received a smaller share of the votes than at any 
election since 1950.  In Scotland, they sustained heavy punishment.  Their share of the 
vote fell from 47% to 41% and they lost 7 of their 31 seats.107  Fittingly, givne that 
they always fought on national policies, Conservatives in both countries identified 
poor national leadership as the primary cause of their difficulties.108 Alec Douglas 
Home made the party look ‘positively medieval’ according to one defeated 
Conservative candidate in Wales.109  No-one in the principality suggested that 
Labour’s championship of a Secretary of State had cost the Tories votes outside a few 
already unwinnable seats such as Merioneth.110 For the most part, devolution had 
again proved a ‘damp squib’ at the election.111 Plaid Cymru, fielding more candidates 
than ever before, saw its share of the vote fall: only in Caernarvon and Merioneth did 
they save their deposits.112  In Scotland, the SNP entered the fray on a major scale for 
the first time, fighting 15 seats.  Only in West Lothian, however, where the nationalist 
candidate garnered 30% of the poll, did they enjoy any success.113 
 
In the final ten years of the period covered by this chapter, however, nationalism was 
to take over from Socialism as the major factor driving Conservative thinking about 
the government of Wales and Scotland.  The section begins by examining 
Conservative reaction to the nationalist victories at by-elections in Carmarthen in 
1966 and Hamilton twelve months later, and then explores the policies developed 
respectively for Wales and Scotland in the light of this analysis. Their response, as 
will be seen, confirmed the party’s traditional willingness to countenance greater self-
determination in Scotland than in Wales; yet Heath’s proposal for an Assembly in 
Edinburgh took the rank and file to the limit of what they were prepared to concede, if 
not beyond.    
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The rise of nationalism as an electoral force in Wales and Scotland so soon after the 
general election of 1966 was remarkable. During the campaign itself, there was little 
sign of what was to come.  As the authors of the Nuffield study remarked in their 
analysis of the campaign:  ‘Even in Scotland a majority of candidates denied that local 
issues mattered significantly’, and quoted one county member as saying, ‘This was a 
national election fought nationally’.114  Although Plaid Cymru’s vote held up well and 
the SNP saw its vote rise considerably, neither party returned a member to 
Westminster.115  Yet within eighteen months both nationalist parties had tasted 
victory.116  In July 1966, a by-election occasioned by the death of Megan Lloyd 
George saw Gwynfor Evans overturn a Labour majority of almost 9,000 in 
Carmarthen to win Plaid Cymru its first seat in parliament; on 9 March 1967, the SNP 
produced a very good performance in a by-election at Pollock and finally, on 2 
November 1967, the SNP achieved the electoral breakthrough they had been 
threatening at Hamilton in Lanarkshire. Winnie Ewing captured 41.6% of the vote in 
defeating Labour’s Alex Wilson. 
 
The Conservative party responded to the upsurge of nationalist sentiment by 
commissioning a study of attitudes to self-government in Scotland and Wales from its 
Opinion Research Centre.  Their report, completed in November 1966, suggested that 
people in both countries suffered from a sense of ‘alienation and neglect’:117  
Westminster-based governments were perceived to be taking more out of the local 
economies than they put back in, and people in both countries believed they would be 
better off if they governed themselves. The Conservative party, meanwhile, was 
perceived as particularly distant, ‘a uniquely English party of the Squirearchy, the 
Establishment, the Church of England and Westminster’.  Yet the ORC also 
concluded that there were important differences between nationalism in the two 
countries.  Nationalist sentiment was consistently stronger and more virulent in 
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Scotland than in Wales and, significantly, a far higher number of existing 
Conservative voters in the former declared that they would consider voting with the 
nationalists than was the case in the principality.   Strikingly, a majority of 
respondents in Scotland, but only one-third in Wales, claimed they would vote for 
Home Rule even if it left them poorer as a consequence.   
 
The report provided an enduring context for Conservative understanding of 
nationalism in Wales and Scotland. In Wales, it was seen to matter less. Plaid 
Cymru’s triumph at Carmarthen was ascribed to the candidate’s ‘considerable 
personal reputation’, nationalist exploitation of local issues, and the defection of 
Liberal voters to Plaid.118 In the longer term, Tory analysts reckoned Plaid was more 
likely to inconvenience Labour in the valley seats than affect the peripheral areas of 
Wales where Conservatism maintained a foothold; the hope was even expressed that 
intervention by the Nationalists in seats like Montgomeryshire and Cardiganshire 
could work to the party’s advantage by splitting the Labour vote.119 There was little to 
be gained by pandering to those who sought greater self-determination for Wales. 
 
Analysis of the situation in Scotland was very different. The ORC’s rolling 
assessment of nationalist progress made clear that the SNP offered the party a direct 
challenge, and competed for many of the same voters.120 Keenly aware that the party 
had lost 11 seats and one-eighth of its voting strength in Scotland since 1955,121 
Edward Heath moved swiftly after the SNP’s victory in Hamilton to demand fresh 
thinking on Scottish governance.122 A committee of the Scottish Unionist party was 
instructed to explore possibilities for a more advanced policy on devolution, and Peter 
Goldman, director of the Conservative Political Centre, was commissioned to write an 
independent report on the same subject in case the Scottish committee interpreted its 
brief too narrowly.  In fact, the committee did not disappoint.123  They called for the 
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establishment of an assembly of approximately 100 directly and indirectly elected 
members, a conclusion broadly in line with Goldman’s recommendations.124  Heath 
endorsed the idea of a Scottish Assembly in a famous speech to the Scottish Party’s 
Conference in Perth on 18 May 1968.   
 
In March 1970, a constitutional committee chaired by Alec Douglas-Home produced 
a report, Scotland’s Government, which detailed how the system would work in 
practice.125 The ‘Convention’ would comprise 125 members, and sit for about 40 days 
a year;  legislation would be referred to it in the same way as it was to the Scottish 
Grand Committee at Westminster: a Bill designated ‘Scottish’ by the Speaker of the 
House of Commons, would receive its Second Reading, Committee and Report stages 
in the Convention before coming back to Westminster for its Third Reading and 
progress to the House of Lords.  The new Convention, which was accepted by a large 
majority at the Scottish Conservative party conference in May 1970,126 was thus not a 
body that would challenge the authority of the Westminster Parliament.  ‘Without an 
executive, with deliberative responsibilities shorn of any powers to challenge or 
confront Westminster over matters of disagreement’, writes Mitchell, ‘the Scottish 
Convention was a mere talking shop.’127   
 
Yet in Wales, even such a watered-down form of devolution remained far beyond the 
limits of what the Conservative party would countenance.  After Labour’s victory at 
the polls in 1964, the Conservative leadership reconciled themselves to the new status 
quo in Welsh government,128 accepting, as Alan Butt Philip has remarked, ‘that the 
party could not dismantle the new Welsh Office and its Secretary of State’. Despite 
losing two previously safe seats, Conway and Monmouth, at the general election of 
1966,129  they took the subsequent rise of nationalism in their stride, and fell back on 
the familiar rhetoric of centralisation to explain the phenomenon.  In September 1967, 
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the Welsh party chairman, Anthony Barber, declared that support for Plaid ‘was really 
revulsion by the people of Wales against over-centralisation and political control by 
Westminster’.130  Following the SNP’s victory at Hamilton in November 1967, the 
Western Mail produced a remarkably similar analysis.  ‘Wales and Scotland’, it 
declared, ‘share an anger at the irrelevance and ignorance of much Whitehall 
decision-making that has been little soothed by either the presence of Secretaries of 
State in the cabinet or the setting up of innumerable toothless committees.’131   
 
The Western Mail had, by this stage, become converted to fully elected assemblies for 
both Wales and Scotland; this, however, was not a policy that found favour within the 
Conservative party at large.  The conviction that Plaid posed a greater threat to Labour 
than their own party meant the Conservatives could safely follow their gut instincts 
and confidently oppose schemes of elaborate self-government such as that proposed 
by the Welsh Office in 1966, which envisaged a two-tier local authority topped by an 
elected ‘Council of Wales’ with executive powers.132 In the wake of the 1966 
election, Heath dispensed with a Shadow Secretary of State for Wales,133 and 
established a policy committee under the party’s new ‘front-bench spokesman’ on 
Wales, the MP for Hereford, David Gibson-Watt. That group quickly came to see the 
administration of Wales in terms of local government reform, with bigger, more 
powerful Welsh local authorities the key to ameliorating the dissatisfaction felt in 
Wales at being governed and administered from London. 134  A future Conservative 
Secretary of State (however that role evolved) could, they believed, ‘live perfectly 
well with eight major authorities and thirty-six minor authorities, whatever their 
political colour’;135 a directly elected, and probably Labour-dominated, Welsh 
parliament would be far more problematic. The declaration of Perth was in no way a 
precedent for action in the principality.136 
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Perth was the high-water mark of late 60s Tory concern with nationalism.  In April 
1969, Harold Wilson appointed a Royal Commission on the Constitution. Their 
lengthy deliberations effectively put the issue on to the political back-burner for five 
years, and both Labour and the Conservatives took the opportunity to avoid making 
any fresh constitutional commitments.137 Devolution was consequently given a 
relatively low priority at the general election of 1970,138  and it became clear that 
there were many even within the Scottish Conservative Party who were far from 
comfortable with Heath’s proposed Convention.  The party’s Scottish chairman, Sir 
Menzies Anderson, failed to mention the policy at all during a major speech in 
Glasgow eight days before the election, prompting the political correspondent of the 
Scotsman to question how committed the Conservatives really were to its 
establishment.139  In Wales, the Tories’ manifesto, A Better Tomorrow for Wales,140 
offered little beyond a promise to retain the Welsh Secretary of State, transfer full 
responsibility for primary and secondary education to the Welsh Office, and allow 
local authorities to ‘elect’ representatives to an advisory council.  The campaign, 
however, was dominated as always by the ‘bread and butter’ issues of jobs and 
taxation, though Heath was quizzed in Cardiff about the very different policies his 
party had put forward for Scotland and Wales by a reporter from the Western Mail.141  
He replied with the well worn line that ‘Scotland had a different legal system and 
there was, as a result, an awful lot of legislation that was concerned exclusively with 
Scotland’. He then added, ‘There are few measures dealing exclusively with Wales’, a 
comment which, as the Mail remarked, rather begged the question.142   
 
The election saw the Conservatives gain 77 seats and return to office with an overall 
majority of 14. In Wales, they took seven seats, though they secured just 27.6% of the 
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vote, their lowest share since 1950.143  In Scotland, the Conservatives won three extra 
seats, but the overall swing to the party was smaller than it was in England, 2.3% as 
against 5.6%.144  The Nationalist parties were eclipsed. Plaid Cymru ran candidates in 
all Welsh seats for the first time, but won none; the SNP ran 65 candidates but 
returned only Donald Stewart for the Western Isles.145   
 
Once in office, Heath moved quickly to axe 17 ministerial positions, among them the 
more junior post at the Welsh Office, the Under-Secretaryship.146  The post of 
Minister of State was retained, and went to Douglas-Watt, while Peter Thomas, for 
many years MP for Conway, but now sitting for Hendon South, became Secretary of 
State.  The party’s chief spokesmen on Welsh issues thus both sat for English 
constituencies, and the lack of importance attached to Wales was emphasised by the 
decision to ask Thomas to combine the post of Secretary of State with the 
Chairmanship of the Party.147 In Scotland, the establishment was retained: a Secretary 
of State with a seat in the Cabinet (Gordon Campbell), a Minster of State (Lady 
Tweedsmuir), and three Under-Secretaries.148 While Heath was still publicly 
supportive of the Convention idea, many of his followers were becoming actively 
hostile. The rising popularity of Labour during the parliament invoked in Scottish 
Tories the same fear that had long haunted their Welsh counterparts, that any Scottish 
‘parliament’ would simply become a stronghold of socialism. At the Scottish Party 
conference in May 1973, Ian Sproat warned that such a body would become ‘a 
splendid platform’ for ‘irresponsible elements’, ‘publicity-seekers’ and 
‘extremists’.149  Devolution was becoming a distant prospect. 
 
In the event, it was in the arena of local government reform that Heath’s 
administration had its biggest constitutional impact on Scotland and Wales.  Peter 
Walker’s 1972 Local Government Act instituted a two-tier structure with 39 counties 
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and 296 Districts.150 In Wales, they adopted the formula proposed in the 1960s by 
David Gibson-Watts’ policy group and forsook an elected assembly in favour of eight 
county authorities.  Nationalists criticised the government for pre-empting the 
Kilbrandon report,151 but the Conservatives insisted that the reform of ‘local 
democracy in Wales brought ‘administration … closer to the ordinary citizen’ and 
addressed the key concerns of moderate Welsh opinion.152  The Local Government 
(Scotland) Act of 1973 also adopted a two-tier model, though one of the upper-level 
regions, Strathclyde, contained more than half the Scottish population.153  Clearly, no 
Scottish assembly could coexist comfortably with such a powerful yet supposedly 
‘inferior’ body.154  In Scotland, as in Wales, local government reform made 
devolution more difficult, and the insight of the Welsh Council of Labour into the 
post-reform situation in the principality is applicable to both countries:  an elected 
assembly, it remarked, would sit atop the two tiers of government ‘like a jellyfish on a 
bed of nails’.155  
 
The Kilbrandon Commission eventually published its ‘diffuse and long-winded’ 
report in October 1973 and recommended that directly elected devolved assemblies 
with responsibility for local government, roads, housing, education and agriculture be 
created for both Wales and Scotland.156  The Tories had refused to give evidence to 
the Commission157 and were determined not to be bounced into a general scheme of 
regional devolution. They found support from three Commissioners (including an 
English Tory MP) who were ‘entirely against devolution to Wales, favouring only a 
Welsh Council with deliberative and advisory powers.’158  The general reaction of 
MPs to the report was, according to the Western Mail, one ‘of complete cynicism’, 
and the Conservative party quietly put its findings to one side, as, indeed, did 
Labour.159 
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Given the muted reaction, it is hardly surprising that neither Labour nor the 
Conservatives made any commitments on devolution at the election of February 1974, 
both regarding the subject as ‘a non-issue outside Wales and Scotland’. 160 Instead, 
Conservatives in both countries stuck closely to the main theme of an election 
precipitated by Edward Heath’s on-going struggle with the mineworkers: ‘Who 
Governs?’161  The strategy was more successful in Wales than Scotland. Plaid won in 
Caernarvon and Merioneth, and came within three votes of taking back Carmarthen 
but the Conservatives increased their haul of seats in Wales to eight, albeit on only 
25.9% of the poll. 162  In Scotland, however, the manichean polarities of the national 
campaign were blurred by the discovery of North Sea oil.  This handed nationalists an 
answer to a question which had long undermined their quest for an independent 
parliament:  how would Scotland survive economically without English tax-payers’ 
money?  Buoyed by Kilbrandon and oil, the SNP took 7 seats; the Conservatives and 
Labour each lost four.  The Tories performed particularly badly and saw their share of 
the vote slip disastrously from 38.5% to 32.9%.163  Whatever the resources of the 
North Sea promised for the British economy in the longer term, its first effect was to 
boost the political economy of Scottish nationalism. 
 
The extraordinarily tight result of the election - Labour had 301 seats; the 
Conservatives 297 - ensured that another contest would occur almost immediately. 
The success of the SNP caused both parties to revisit their Scottish policies over the 
summer.164  The Conservatives could not afford to appear anti-devolutionary, and 
accepted a new proposal for a devolved assembly in Scotland, with a membership 
recruited from local authorities rather than elected directly.  This was backed up by a 
summer poster campaign which sought to brand the SNP as the party not of 
devolution but of separatism.165  The party also promised a Scottish Development 
Fund to handle oil revenues. Heath, like Wilson, visited Scotland twice during the 
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campaign, an indication of its importance as an election battleground. However, he 
made little reference to his party’s plans for devolution, choosing instead to 
emphasize national unity, the central theme in the Tory campaign, and to attack the 
SNP for their alleged ambition to break up the United Kingdom.166 
 
 In Wales, the Conservatives naturally offered less, but their message was essentially 
the same. The manifesto, For Wales and Her People, called for unity and added, ‘At a 
time when society faces increasing pressures, irreversible constitutional experiments 
have no place. Any changes in the system of Government must be evolutionary’.167  
Nevertheless, they promised to increase the functions of the Secretary of State for 
Wales and to ensure that money voted by Parliament for expenditure by the Welsh 
Office would be in the form of a block grant, so that the Secretary of State would 
decide how the money was spent ‘with Welsh interests and advice in mind’.  The 
manifesto also promised to create a Select Committee made up of Welsh MPs which 
would have the power to examine all matters relating to Wales and to call Ministers, 
civil servants and other experts before it.  In addition, a strengthened Welsh Council 
would have the majority of its members elected from the county and district councils 
to increase its influence. 
 
Labour were returned to office with an overall majority of 3.  The most significant 
aspect of the result, however, was the continued rise of nationalism in Scotland.  The 
SNP won 11 seats, and positioned themselves as the second party in Scottish politics 
by capturing 30% of the votes. Their success seems to have come in large part at the 
expense of the Tory party, whose vote slumped by 8.2%.168  The dire warnings of the 
surveys conducted by the ORC after 1966 seemed finally to be coming true.  In 
Wales, the election was much less dramatic.  Plaid recaptured Carmarthen, but it lost 
support in many of the valley constituencies, and became more dependent on the 
isolated, Welsh-speaking rural areas of Wales.169  The Conservatives, though their 
share of the vote fell to just 23.9%, retained all 8 of their seats in the principality.170  
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The outlook was not, however, a bright one: whereas they had lost only six deposits in 
the February election, in October they forfeited no fewer than 11:  they, too, were 




Conservative responses to devolution in the period after 1945 were crucially shaped 
by two external forces, socialism and nationalism.  In the years immediately after the 
Second World War, concern about the Labour government’s centralising policies, and 
a fear that socialism might ‘hold the door open for Communism’, prompted the 
party’s attempt to harness ‘local patriotism’ in Scotland and Wales by promising 
further measures of devolution.  Twenty years later, it was the rise of nationalism that 
drove Conservative policy formation.  The success of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party, at Carmarthen and Hamilton respectively, prompted Edward Heath to 
commit his party to the cause of a Scottish Assembly. 
 
However, the Conservatives’ approach to devolution was always tempered by a third, 
internal, force – its own civic nationalism.  As Philip Lynch has explained, ‘Instead of 
being defined in ethnic or racial terms, conservative accounts of the nation focus on 
allegiance to common institutions, a shared history and a political culture which 
fosters common values.’171  This had two principal consequences.  First, the solutions 
proposed by the Conservative party never threatened to limit the fundamental 
authority of the Westminster parliament.  Even their most advanced proposal, a 
Convention for Scotland, was denied legislative powers.  Second, because the party 
lacked ideological commitment to the principle of devolved government, the Tories 
tended to revert to a policy of inaction as soon as the immediate external pressure 
prompting the adoption of a devolutionary perspective died away. Thus, though the 
manifesto pledges of 1951 were largely honoured, the Conservatives’ own electoral 
victory to some extent vanquished the party’s nightmares of socialist rule:  as a 
consequence, the period 1951-64 witnessed no further upgrading of devolved 
institutions of government in either Scotland or Wales.  Similarly, when the popular 
support for nationalism in Scotland and Wales ebbed in the late 60s and early 70s, the 
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Conservative leadership took advantage of the Kilbrandon report’s lengthy gestation 
and allowed devolution to languish.   
 
One final factor influencing the nature of the solutions proposed by the Conservative 
party should be noted. Their commitment to devolution was always at root, a 
calculation made with an eye to electoral success.  Since the party had much more to 
lose in Scotland than in Wales, it was natural that the solutions advanced for Scotland 
should have been more far-reaching than anything proposed for the principality.  The 
Conservative Party had a much greater natural sympathy with the claims of Scottish 
nationhood, and consequently recognised the potential strength of nationalism’s 
appeal for those who might otherwise consider themselves ‘natural’ Tory voters.  In 
Wales, by contrast, the Conservatives constantly questioned whether there existed a 
real desire for devolution.  Whilst the party’s own polling data suggested that some 
greater recognition of Wales by central government would be welcomed, it fancied 
that the devolution debate was got up by the media and the chattering classes. The 
shallow basis of the party’s support in the principality, in any case, meant that any 
large-scale measure of devolution, such as an elected assembly, would simply 
institutionalise a Labour majority and make life extraordinarily difficult for a future 
Conservative government.  As a consequence, they became increasingly open in their 
opposition to Welsh devolution, calculating that they had little to lose politically from 
such a position. The trend of election results between 1945 and 1974 vindicated this 
decision.  However powerful the attractions of self-government proved to Scottish 
voters, devolution turned out to be ‘the dog that did not bark’ in Wales.  The vagaries 
of the first past the post system consistently failed to reflect in terms of seats won the 
scale of Conservative support in Wales, yet by the end of the period covered by this 
chapter, there were eight Conservative MPs in the principality.172   
 
There is no doubt that, as Alan Butt Philip has pointed out, the actions of the 
Conservatives in the period covered here had a significant impact in propelling Wales 
along the road to devolution.  The Conservative Policy for Wales and Monmouthshire 
produced in 1949 was the first attempt by any of the major parties to develop a 
distinct approach to Welsh policy, and by accepting this, as much as by recognising 
                                                 
172 In 1959, they won approximately 30% of the votes but received only 17% of Welsh seats.  
Even in October 1974, their 23.9% of the votes cast in Wales won them only 22.2% of the seats. 
 31 
the principality’s claim to Cabinet-level recognition, it set a precedent which, over the 
course of a generation, increased the likelihood of self-government for Wales.  It was, 
however, an outcome to which the Tories remained adamantly opposed.  
 
 
